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Public Good Provision With Constitutional Constraint

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  • Kang Rong

Abstract

This article studies the public good provision problem, in which the principal faces a constitutional constraint in the sense that in order for a public good provision mechanism to be implemented, it must first be approved by agents under a prespecified voting rule. I find that as long as the voting rule is not the unanimity rule, the principal can propose a mechanism such that first‐best efficiency of provision of the public good is achieved. I also consider various constraints, such as prohibition of discriminatory mechanisms and the existence of vote buying, and discuss optimal voting rules in these situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Kang Rong, 2018. "Public Good Provision With Constitutional Constraint," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1187-1208, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:3:p:1187-1208
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12301
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