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Returns System With Rebates

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  • Tatsuhiko Nariu
  • David Flath
  • Atsuo Utaka

Abstract

We consider a variant of the newsvendor problem. Atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market‐determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand. After the orders are filled, the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not. We show that, in this setting, a returns system with rebates (with previously set buy‐back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold) implements the optimal production and sales strategy, attaining maximum expected profit in the channel.

Suggested Citation

  • Tatsuhiko Nariu & David Flath & Atsuo Utaka, 2012. "Returns System With Rebates," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1243-1256, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:4:p:1243-1256
    DOI: j.1468-2354.2012.00719.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Howard P. Marvel & Hao Wang, 2007. "Inventories, Manufacturer Returns Policies, and Equilibrium Price Dispersion under Demand Uncertainty," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 1031-1051, December.
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    3. Marvel, Howard P & Peck, James, 1995. "Demand Uncertainty and Returns Policies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 691-714, August.
    4. Tatsuhiko Nariu, 1996. "Manufacturer Acceptance Of Returns," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 426-431, December.
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