IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/finmar/v14y2005i2p43-106.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Financial Supervision: Integrated or Specialized? The case of Latin America and the Caribbean

Author

Listed:
  • Edgardo Demaestri
  • Federico Guerrero

Abstract

This paper discusses the relative merits of the two approaches of financial regulation and supervision for the case of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In doing so, it reviews the main arguments advanced in the specialized literature in pro and against of each approach. All the theoretical arguments are contrasted with available country experiences from around the world and discussed with a focus on the Latin American and Caribbean countries. A methodology to analyze the efficacy and the efficiency of each approach in meeting the main objectives of financial regulation is also provided. The paper concludes that in the present circumstances, the net benefits of adopting an integrated approach probably exceed the net benefits stemming from the adoption of a specialized approach for most of the countries in the region.

Suggested Citation

  • Edgardo Demaestri & Federico Guerrero, 2005. "Financial Supervision: Integrated or Specialized? The case of Latin America and the Caribbean," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 43-106, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:finmar:v:14:y:2005:i:2:p:43-106
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0963-8008.2005.00080.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-8008.2005.00080.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0963-8008.2005.00080.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
    2. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-1428, November.
    3. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
    4. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lazopoulos, Ioannis & Gabriel, Vasco, 2019. "Policy mandates and institutional architecture," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 122-134.
    2. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777, March.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.
    5. Joon-Ho Hahm & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Causes of the Korean Financial Crisis: Lessons for Policy," NBER Working Papers 7483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Agur, I. & Demertzis, M., 2010. "Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking," Discussion Paper 2010-30S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Lamberte, Mario B., 2002. "Central Banking in the Philippines: Then, Now and the Future," Discussion Papers DP 2002-10, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    8. Ioannidou, Vasso P., 2005. "Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 58-85, January.
    9. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-378, November.
    10. Dumitriu, Ramona & Stefanescu, Răzvan, 2013. "Decizii strategice ale politicii monetare [Strategic decisions of the Monetary Policy]," MPRA Paper 51242, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Nov 2013.
    11. Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker & Paolo Dasgupta, 2002. "The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 6(3), pages 397-427.
    12. Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, January.
    13. Athanassiou, Phoebus, 2011. "Financial sector supervisors' accountability: a european perspective," Legal Working Paper Series 12, European Central Bank.
    14. BIKAI, J. Landry & KENKOUO, Guy Albert, 2015. "Analysis and evaluation of the Monetary Policy Transmission Channels in the CEMAC: A SVAR and SPVAR Approaches," MPRA Paper 78227, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    16. Artha, I.K.D.S. & de Haan, J., 2010. "Legal and actual central bank independence," Research Report 10004, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    19. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    20. Ponce, Jorge, 2010. "Lender of last resort policy: What reforms are necessary?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 188-206, April.
    21. Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005. "Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 11792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:finmar:v:14:y:2005:i:2:p:43-106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.