The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
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DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15668
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Cited by:
- Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org.
- Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022.
"Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
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- Zeng, Yishu, 2023. "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2018.
"Persuasion Meets Delegation,"
Discussion Papers
2018-06, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2024. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Discussion Papers 2024-04, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Papers 1902.02628, arXiv.org.
- Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
- Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2023. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1055-1095, April.
- Lee, Logan M. & Waddell, Glen R., 2021. "Diversity and the timing of preference in hiring decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 432-459.
- Azarmsa, Ehsan & Cong, Lin William, 2020. "Persuasion in relationship finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 818-837.
- Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2020.
"Buyer-optimal extensionproof information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Stefan Terstiege & Cédric Wasser, 2018. "Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_034, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024.
"Organizing Data Analytics,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2021. "Organizing Data Analytics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2024. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pham, Hien, "undated". "a reprendre_ WP annulé," TSE Working Papers 21-1263, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Lyu, Chen, 2023. "Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Information Design with Costly State Verifi cation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_502, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Ozan Candogan & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver," Papers 2101.10431, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
- Meng, Delong, 2021. "Learning from like-minded people," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 231-250.
- Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
- Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
- Candogan, Ozan & Strack, Philipp, 2023. "Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
- Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann & Yamashita, Takuro, 2023. "Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
- Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 0. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
- Maryam Saeedi & Ali Shourideh, 2020. "Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard," Papers 2008.09529, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2023. "Experiments versus distributions of posteriors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 58-60.
- Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.
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