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Provision of a Public Good with Multiple Dynasties

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  • Larry Karp

Abstract

Because carbon emissions create externalities across countries and generations, climate policy requires international cooperation and intergenerational altruism. A differential game using overlapping generations with intergenerational altruism shows how altruism and cooperation interact, and provides estimates of their relative importance in determining equilibrium steady†state carbon levels. A small increase in cooperation has a larger equilibrium effect than a small increase in altruism, beginning at empirically plausible levels. A large increase in altruism may have a larger equilibrium effect, compared to a large increase in cooperation. Climate investments may be dynamic strategic complements, reducing but not eliminating incentives to free ride.

Suggested Citation

  • Larry Karp, 2017. "Provision of a Public Good with Multiple Dynasties," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(607), pages 2641-2664, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:607:p:2641-2664
    DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12458
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    Cited by:

    1. Dengler, Sebastian & Gerlagh, Reyer & Trautmann, Stefan T. & van de Kuilen, Gijs, 2018. "Climate policy commitment devices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 331-343.
    2. Frederick van der Ploeg & Armon Rezai, 2020. "Stranded Assets in the Transition to a Carbon-Free Economy," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 281-298, October.
    3. Terrence Iverson & Larry Karp, 2021. "Carbon Taxes and Climate Commitment with Non-constant Time Preference," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 764-799.
    4. Meier, Felix & Rickels, Wilfried & Quaas, Martin F. & Traeger, Christian, 2022. "Carbon dioxide removal in a global analytic climate economy," Kiel Working Papers 2227, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Rising, James A. & Taylor, Charlotte & Ives, Matthew C. & Ward, Robert E.T., 2022. "Challenges and innovations in the economic evaluation of the risks of climate change," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    6. Arnaud Goussebaïle, 2024. "Democratic Climate Policies with Overlapping Generations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(5), pages 1249-1273, May.
    7. Karp, Larry & Rezai, Armon, 2017. "Asset prices and climate policy," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt6fx579fp, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    8. Rising, James A. & Taylor, Charlotte & Ives, Matthew C. & Ward, Robert E.t., 2022. "Challenges and innovations in the economic evaluation of the risks of climate change," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 114941, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Niko Jaakkola & Antony Millner, 2022. "Nondogmatic Climate Policy," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 807-841.

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