IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/econjl/v127y2017i606p2504-2524.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency

Author

Listed:
  • Salvatore Piccolo
  • Giovanni Immordino

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni Immordino, 2017. "Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(606), pages 2504-2524, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:606:p:2504-2524
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2017.127.issue-606
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Astrid Gamba & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo, 2016. "Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def039, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    2. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2018. "Criminal Networks, Market Externalities and Optimal Leniency," CSEF Working Papers 519, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Burgstaller, Lilith & Pfeil, Katharina, 2024. "Why whistleblowing does not deter collaborative tax evasion," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 24/3, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    4. Lundberg, Alexander, 2019. "Leniency Can Increase Deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    5. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2024. "Criminal network, leniency, and market externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.
    6. Paolo Buccirossi & Giovanni Immordino & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 411-431, June.
    7. C. Bravard & J. Durieu & J. Kamphorst & S. Roché & S. Sémirat, 2023. "Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(6), pages 1361-1393, December.
    8. Soeren C. Schwuchow, 2023. "Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 469-509, June.
    9. Gamba, Astrid & Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2018. "Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 79-88.
    10. Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng, 2017. "Criminal network formation and optimal detection policy: The role of cascade of detection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 43-63.
    11. C. Bravard & J. Durieu & J. Kamphorst & S. Roché & S. Sémirat, 2023. "Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(6), pages 1361-1393, December.
    12. Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Roberti, 2018. "Optimal Leniency and the Organization Design of Group Delinquency," CSEF Working Papers 503, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    13. Immordino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore & Roberti, Paolo, 2020. "Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:606:p:2504-2524. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.