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False Diagnoses: Pitfalls of Testing For Asymmetric Information In Insurance Markets

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  • David Meza
  • David C. Webb

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  • David Meza & David C. Webb, 2017. "False Diagnoses: Pitfalls of Testing For Asymmetric Information In Insurance Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(606), pages 2358-2377, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:606:p:2358-2377
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2017.127.issue-606
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    Cited by:

    1. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco & Reyniers, Diane, 2021. "Too much trade: The hidden problem of adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco, 2019. "Too Little Lending: A Problem of Symmetric Information," MPRA Paper 93700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Daniel Bauer & Jochen Russ & Nan Zhu, 2020. "Asymmetric information in secondary insurance markets: Evidence from the life settlements market," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1143-1175, July.
    4. De La Mata, Dolores & Olivella, Pau & Valdés, Maria Nieves, 2022. "Asymmetric Information with multiple risks: the case of the Chilean Private Health Insurance Market," UC3M Working papers. Economics 35441, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Jan Michael Bauer & Jörg Schiller & Christopher Schreckenberger, 2020. "Heterogeneous selection in the market for private supplemental dental insurance: evidence from Germany," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 205-231, July.
    6. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco & Reyniers, Diane, 2021. "Too much trade: A problem of adverse selection," MPRA Paper 107084, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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