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Private Information and Altruism in Bidding Roscas

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  • Stefan Klonner

Abstract

This article studies how altruism improves allocations in a private information environment where strategic behaviour reduces economic welfare. A theoretical analysis establishes that, in an environment characterised by uncertainty and private information, outcomes of auctions in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (Roscas) are more efficient when bidders’ preferences are altruistic rather than selfish. A semi‐parametric structural estimation technique for Rosca auctions is presented. A parametric structural estimation identifies interactions between group characteristics and bidder altruism. It is found that effective leadership and intra‐group diversity are associated with a greater extent of bidder altruism and thus more efficient intra‐Rosca allocations.

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  • Stefan Klonner, 2008. "Private Information and Altruism in Bidding Roscas," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 775-800, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:528:p:775-800
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02142.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ksoll, Christopher & Lilleør, Helene Bie & Lønborg, Jonas Helth & Rasmussen, Ole Dahl, 2016. "Impact of Village Savings and Loan Associations: Evidence from a cluster randomized trial," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 70-85.
    2. Mwansakilwa, Chibamba & Tembo, Gelson & Zulu, Maureen Mwamba & Wamulume, Mukata, 2017. "Village savings and loan associations and household welfare: Evidence from Eastern and Western Zambia," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 12(1), March.
    3. Kristina Czura & Stefan Klonner, 2018. "Financial Market Responses to a Natural Disaster: Evidence from Local Credit Networks and the Indian Ocean Tsunami," CESifo Working Paper Series 7354, CESifo.
    4. Czura, Kristina & Klonner, Stefan, 2023. "Financial market responses to a natural disaster: Evidence from credit networks and the Indian Ocean tsunami," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    5. Rediet Abebe & Adam Eck & Christian Ikeokwu & Samuel Taggart, 2022. "An Algorithmic Introduction to Savings Circles," Papers 2203.12486, arXiv.org.
    6. Maitra, Pushkar & Miller, Ray & Sedai, Ashish, 2023. "Household welfare effects of ROSCAs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    7. Pushkar Maitra & Ray Miller & Ashish Sedai, 2022. "Household Welfare Effects of ROSCAs," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-14, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. Czura, Kristina & Klonner, Stefan, 2010. "The Tsunami and the Chit Fund- Evidence from the Indian Ocean Tsunami Hit on Credit Demand in South India," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 46, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    9. Sedai, Ashish Kumar & Vasudevan, Ramaa & Alves Pena, Anita, 2021. "Friends and benefits? Endogenous rotating savings and credit associations as alternative for women’s empowerment in India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    10. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Non-Altruistic Equilibria," MPRA Paper 88347, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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