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The benefits and costs to managers of voluntary accounting disclosure — A discussion of: “Current cost disclosers and nondisclosers: Theory and Canadian evidenceâ€

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  • GEORGE J. BENSTON

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  • George J. Benston, 1986. "The benefits and costs to managers of voluntary accounting disclosure — A discussion of: “Current cost disclosers and nondisclosers: Theory and Canadian evidenceâ€," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(1), pages 35-44, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:3:y:1986:i:1:p:35-44
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1986.tb00624.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(2), pages 110-110.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Benston, George J., 1985. "The self-serving management hypothesis : Some evidence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 67-84, April.
    4. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    5. Coughlan, Anne T. & Schmidt, Ronald M., 1985. "Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 43-66, April.
    6. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 351-351.
    7. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    8. Healy, Paul M., 1985. "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 85-107, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce J. Mcconomy, 1998. "Bias and Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts: An Evaluation of the Impact of Auditing," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 167-195, June.
    2. Thomas W. Scott, 1991. "Pension disclosures under SFAS No. 87: Theory and evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(1), pages 62-81, September.

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