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The Earnings Quality Information Content of Dividend Policies and Audit Pricing

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  • Bradley P. Lawson
  • Dechun Wang

Abstract

Recent studies indicate dividends are associated with higher†quality earnings. Our study extends the literature by examining whether dividends' information is associated with auditors' assessment of their clients' earnings quality. Our results show that auditors charge lower fees to dividend†paying clients than to nondividend†paying clients and the average fee discount ranges from 6.0 to 10.6 percent. More importantly, we find dividends have an interactive effect with respect to earnings persistence and earnings manipulation: the negative association between audit fees and earnings persistence is more pronounced for dividend firms; and dividend payouts mitigate the positive relation between earnings manipulation risk and audit fees. Our results imply dividends reduce audit risk by enhancing clients' earnings quality information. We contribute to the literature by showing that auditors reflect the earnings quality information content of firms' dividend policies in their pricing decisions.Selon les études récentes, les dividendes sont associés à des résultats de meilleure qualité. Les auteurs enrichissent la documentation relative à cette question en se demandant si l'information relative aux dividendes est associée à l’évaluation, par les auditeurs, de la qualité des résultats de leurs clients. Selon leurs observations, les auditeurs demandent des honoraires moins élevés aux clients qui versent des dividendes qu’à ceux qui n'en versent pas, escompte qui se situe, en moyenne, entre 6,0 et 10,6 pour cent. Fait plus important encore, les auteurs constatent que les dividendes ont une incidence interactive sur la persistance et la manipulation des résultats : le lien négatif entre les honoraires d'audit et la persistance des résultats est davantage marqué dans le cas de sociétés versant des dividendes; et les versements de dividendes atténuent le lien positif entre le risque de manipulation des résultats et les honoraires d'audit. Leurs observations mènent les auteurs à la conclusion que les dividendes réduisent le risque lié à l'audit en améliorant l'information quant à la qualité des résultats des clients. L’étude contribue aux écrits portant sur cette question en démontrant que les auditeurs tiennent compte, dans leur tarification, du contenu en information quant à la qualité des résultats des politiques de dividendes des sociétés.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradley P. Lawson & Dechun Wang, 2016. "The Earnings Quality Information Content of Dividend Policies and Audit Pricing," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(4), pages 1685-1719, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:33:y:2016:i:4:p:1685-1719
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12179
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    Cited by:

    1. Feng Guo & Chenxi Lin & Adi Masli & Michael S. Wilkins, 2021. "Auditor Responses to Shareholder Activism," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 63-95, March.
    2. Wang, Jiaxin & Zhao, Mu & Huang, Xiang & Song, Zilong & Sun, Di, 2024. "Supply chain diffusion mechanisms for AI applications: A perspective on audit pricing," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    3. Barua, Abhijit & Lennox, Clive & Raghunandan, Aneesh, 2020. "Are audit fees discounted in initial year audit engagements?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2).
    4. Jeffrey Pittman & Yuping Zhao, 2020. "Debt Covenant Restriction, Financial Misreporting, and Auditor Monitoring," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 2145-2185, December.
    5. Hakim Lyngstad{aa}s & Johannes Mauritzen, 2023. "Adults in the room? The auditor and dividends in small firms: Evidence from a natural experiment," Papers 2301.11079, arXiv.org.
    6. Wang, Yusiyu, 2019. "Regulation, protest, and spatial economics," Other publications TiSEM 809d31ac-b5a7-4e6c-b2eb-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Weiping Li & Xuezhi Zhang & Shuyi Cheng & Xiaohang Ren, 2024. "Clear the air via dividends: Corporates' response to air pollution," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 3383-3396, May.

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