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Mandatory Disclosure, Generation of Decision†Relevant Information, and Market Entry

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  • Georg T. Schneider
  • Andreas Scholze

Abstract

We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision†relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results show that an incentive not to generate internal information arises for two reasons: If the incumbent's cost advantage is sufficiently large, disclosing aggregated information can be an instrument to avoid competition by reducing the likelihood of market entry. If the incumbent's cost advantage is small, disclosing aggregated information attracts competition by increasing the likelihood of market entry. In this case, imprecise cost information serves as a commitment device to reduce the intensity of competition by forcing the competitor to take into account his efficiency disadvantage in making his production decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Georg T. Schneider & Andreas Scholze, 2015. "Mandatory Disclosure, Generation of Decision†Relevant Information, and Market Entry," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(4), pages 1353-1372, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:32:y:2015:i:4:p:1353-1372
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12142
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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Königsgruber & Pietro Perotti & Oliver Schinnerl & Fanis Tsoligkas & David Windisch, 2021. "Product Market Competition and Firms’ Disclosure of Cross‐segment Differences in Performance," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 57(4), pages 709-736, December.
    2. Biehl, Henrike & Bleibtreu, Christopher & Stefani, Ulrike, 2024. "The real effects of financial reporting: Evidence and suggestions for future research," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Kazunori Miwa, 2021. "An Experimental Study on Information Acquisition and Disclosure in a Cournot Duopoly Market," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-01-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Hoang, Daniel & Ruckes, Martin, 2017. "Corporate risk management, product market competition, and disclosure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 107-121.

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