IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/canjec/v37y2004i2p269-293.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Direct sale of information when precision is unobservable

Author

Listed:
  • Saltuk Ozerturk

Abstract

. This paper studies the incentives of an information seller to provide precise information when precision is not observable and investors with rational expectations can extract information from the equilibrium asset price. I show that the seller can verify her precision by employing a non‐linear contract. I derive the equilibrium fee for information as a function of the seller's incentives, the sales volume, and buyers’ trading intensity. I also analyse the implications of allowing the seller to trade on her own account for truthfulness and precision choice. JEL Classification: G11, G14, D42 La vente directe d’information quand la précision n’est pas observable. Ce mémoire étudie les incitations d’un vendeur d’information à fournir de l’information précise quand la précision n’est pas observable et que des investisseurs qui ont des anticipations rationnelles peuvent extraire de l’information du prix d’équilibre d’un actif. L’auteur montre que le vendeur peut vérifier sa précision à l’aide d’un contrat non linéaire, et dérive le prix d’équilibre pour l’information comme fonction des incitations du vendeur, du volume de ventes, et de l’intensité de transactions des acheteurs. On analyse aussi les implications qu’entraîne la possibilité pour le vendeur de transiger pour son propre compte sur le choix du degré de précision et de vérité.

Suggested Citation

  • Saltuk Ozerturk, 2004. "Direct sale of information when precision is unobservable," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(2), pages 269-293, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:37:y:2004:i:2:p:269-293
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00002.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00002.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00002.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    2. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1985. "Delegated portfolio management," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, June.
    3. Hellwig, Martin F., 1980. "On the aggregation of information in competitive markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 477-498, June.
    4. Albert S. Kyle, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(3), pages 317-355.
    5. Allen, Franklin, 1990. "The market for information and the origin of financial intermediation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-30, March.
    6. Stoughton, Neal M, 1993. "Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 2009-2028, December.
    7. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1024-1050, October.
    8. Brennan, Michael J & Hughes, Patricia J, 1991. "Stock Prices and the Supply of Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(5), pages 1665-1691, December.
    9. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    10. Bruno Biais & Laurent Germain, 2002. "Incentive-Compatible Contracts for the Sale of Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 987-1003.
    11. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1986. "A monopolistic market for information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 400-438, August.
    12. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1990. "Direct and Indirect Sale of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 901-928, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. García, Diego & Vanden, Joel M., 2009. "Information acquisition and mutual funds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1965-1995, September.
    2. Wilhelm Jr, William J & Chen, Zhaohui, 2005. "The Industrial Organization of Financial Market Information Production," CEPR Discussion Papers 5314, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2007. "Stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 768-785, September.
    4. Germain, Laurent, 2005. "Strategic noise in competitive markets for the sale of information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 179-209, April.
    5. Giovanni Cespa, 2008. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long‐Lived Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 639-672, April.
    6. Mahajan, Sandeep & Sweeney, Richard J., 2001. "Strategic choices of quality, differentiation and pricing in financial services," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1447-1473, August.
    7. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2005. "Stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
    9. Biais, Bruno & Glosten, Larry & Spatt, Chester, 2005. "Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 217-264, May.
    10. Dev, Pritha, 2013. "Transfer of information by an informed trader," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 58-71.
    11. Bryan Kelly & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2012. "Testing Asymmetric-Information Asset Pricing Models," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(5), pages 1366-1413.
    12. Shiyang Huang & Yan Xiong & Liyan Yang, 2022. "Skill Acquisition and Data Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6116-6144, August.
    13. Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 2009. "Optimal financial education," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-9, January.
    14. Dang, Tri Vi & Felgenhauer, Mike, 2012. "Information provision in over-the-counter markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 79-96.
    15. Biais, Bruno & Foucault, Thierry, 1993. "Asymétrie d’information et marchés financiers : une synthèse de la littérature récente," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 69(1), pages 8-44, mars.
    16. Naik, Narayan Y., 1997. "Multi-period information markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 1229-1258, June.
    17. Briana Chang & Harrison Hong, 2017. "Assignment of Stock Market Coverage," NBER Working Papers 23115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Markus Glaser & Martin Weber, 2007. "Overconfidence and trading volume," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 32(1), pages 1-36, June.
    19. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
    20. Martin Dierker, 2006. "Endogenous Information Acquisition with Cournot Competition," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 369-395, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:37:y:2004:i:2:p:269-293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.