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Leadership selection, internal promotion, and bureaucratic corruption in less developed polities

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  • James E. Rauch

Abstract

The establishment of a professional government bureaucracy in place of political appointees is an important component of an enabling environment for private enterprise. I show that internal promotion can help to bring to power individuals who highly value (relative to income) imposition of their preferences over collective goods on the public. Such individuals restrain the corruption of their subordinates as a byproduct of their efforts to implement their preferences using tax revenue. As a result, large‐scale and petty corruption tend to move together and both tend to be lower the longer the practice of internal promotion has been in place. JEL Classification: D73 Sélection des leaders, promotion interne, et corruption bureaucratique dans les pays en voie de développement. La mise en place d'une bureaucratie gouvernementale professionnelle pour remplacer les nominations politiques constitue un élément important pour créer un environnement porteur pour l'entreprise privée. On montre que la promotion interne peut aider à porter au pouvoir des personnes qui valorisent beaucoup la possibilité d'imposer au public leurs préférences quant aux biens collectifs (par opposition à la simple recherche de revenus personnels accrus). De telles personnes vont limiter la corruption de leurs subordonnés en cherchant à imposer leurs préférences dans l'usage des rentrées fiscales. En conséquence, la grande et la petite corruption tendent àêtre co‐reliées, et toutes deux tendent à décroître à proportion que l'on pratique la promotion interne.

Suggested Citation

  • James E. Rauch, 2001. "Leadership selection, internal promotion, and bureaucratic corruption in less developed polities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 240-258, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:240-258
    DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00073
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiahua Che & Kim‐Sau Chung & Xue Qiao, 2021. "Career Concerns, Beijing Style," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1513-1535, November.
    2. Besley, Tim & Kudamatsu, Masayuki, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 6371, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Che, Jiahua & Chung, Kim-Sau & Qiao, Xue, 2019. "The king can do no wrong: On the criminal immunity of leaders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 15-26.
    4. Audrey Hu & Liang Zhou, 2007. "Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-096/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Sameen A. Mohsin Ali, 2022. "Networks of Effectiveness? The Impact of Politicization on Bureaucratic Performance in Pakistan," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(2), pages 733-753, April.
    6. Tran, My Thi Ha, 2021. "Public Sector Management And Corruption In Asean Plus Six," OSF Preprints stxw4, Center for Open Science.
    7. Che, Jiahua & Chung, Kim-Sau & Qiao, Xue, 2013. "The good, the bad, and the civil society," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 68-76.
    8. Gervan Fearon, 2009. "Economics of public good provision: auditing, outsourcing, and bribery," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3), pages 997-1022, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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