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Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment Treaties

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  • Eric Arias
  • James R. Hollyer
  • B. Peter Rosendorff

Abstract

Capital accumulation is essential for economic development, but investors face risk when putting their capital to productive use. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) commit leaders to limiting their takings of foreign assets and the revenues they generate. We offer theory and evidence that BITs enhance leader survival more in autocracies than democracies. BITs improve the “investment climate” in signatory states, and they do so by more in autocratic polities. Hazard models offer supporting evidence of improved autocratic leader survival. The improvement in the investment climate is evidenced by improvement of creditworthiness scores and higher sovereign bond prices, again with greater effect in autocratic states. Autocratic leaders have the most to gain from importing property rights–enhancing institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Arias & James R. Hollyer & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2018. "Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment Treaties," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(4), pages 905-921, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:62:y:2018:i:4:p:905-921
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12383
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Tuuli-Anna Huikuri, 2023. "Constraints and incentives in the investment regime: How bargaining power shapes BIT reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 361-391, April.
    3. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    4. Edmund J. Malesky & Helen V. Milner, 2021. "Fostering global value chains through international agreements: Evidence from Vietnam," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 443-482, November.
    5. Baccini,Leonardo & Fiorini,Matteo & Hoekman,Bernard M. & Altomonte,Carlo & Colantone,Italo, 2021. "Global Value Chains and Deep Integration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9598, The World Bank.
    6. Tag, Mehmet Nasih, 2021. "Judicial institutions of property rights protection and foreign direct investment inflows," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    7. Rafał Balina & Marta Idasz-Balina, 2021. "Drivers of Individual Credit Risk of Retail Customers—A Case Study on the Example of the Polish Cooperative Banking Sector," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(12), pages 1-26, December.
    8. Ganga, Paula & Kalyanpur, Nikhil, 2022. "The limits of global property rights: Quasi-Experimental evidence from the Energy Charter Treaty," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    9. Elsig, Manfred & Ganeson, Kirthana & Jusoh, Sufian & Lugg, Andrew, 2024. "Why is there no investor-state dispute settlement in RCEP? Bargaining and Contestation in the Investment Regime," Papers 1436, World Trade Institute.
    10. Tag, Mehmet Nasih & Degirmen, Suleyman, 2022. "Economic freedom and foreign direct investment: Are they related?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 737-752.
    11. Jacque Gao, 2022. "Investment with insecure property rights: Capital outflow openness under dictatorship," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 569-595, July.

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