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Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

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  • Lucas M. Novaes

Abstract

This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinctive brands, organization, and activists to mobilize individuals, parties “hire” local notables to broker votes among a local, nonpartisan constituency. However, brokers may be unreliable agents, regularly changing political allegiances in search of better returns for their brokerage among the module of voters they control. This free agency from brokers hinders durable party–voter linkages and results in electorally vulnerable parties. Measuring how brokers influence parties is empirically complex, but taking advantage of the fact that in Brazil these agents are also local candidates, this article demonstrates the negative electoral consequences of brokers' free agency on party performance. Natural experiments and an unexpected, temporary institutional reform that discouraged disloyalty for brokers demonstrate this relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucas M. Novaes, 2018. "Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(1), pages 84-98, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:62:y:2018:i:1:p:84-98
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12331
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Michael Auerbach & Tariq Thachil, 2020. "Cultivating Clients: Reputation, Responsiveness, and Ethnic Indifference in India's Slums," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(3), pages 471-487, July.
    2. Garay, Candelaria & Palmer-Rubin, Brian & Poertner, Mathias, 2020. "Organizational and partisan brokerage of social benefits: Social policy linkages in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    3. Stommes, Drew & Aronow, P. M. & Sävje, Fredrik, 2023. "On the Reliability of Published Findings Using the Regression Discontinuity Design in Political Science," I4R Discussion Paper Series 22, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
    4. Gallego, Jorge & Guardado, Jenny & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2023. "Do gifts buy votes? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    5. Shenoy, Ajay & Zimmermann, Laura V., 2021. "The Workforce of Clientelism: The Case of Local Officials in the Party Machine," GLO Discussion Paper Series 916, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    6. Rodrigo Schneider & Diloá Athias & Mauricio Bugarin, 2019. "Does enfranchisement affect fiscal policy? Theory and empirical evidence on Brazil," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 389-412, December.
    7. Troncone, Massimo & Valli, Roberto, 2024. "Who Pays for the Church? Political Connections and Religious Clientelism in Post-War Italy," OSF Preprints nsyc3, Center for Open Science.
    8. Gouvêa, Raphael & Girardi, Daniele, 2021. "Partisanship and local fiscal policy: Evidence from Brazilian cities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    9. Diogo Baerlocher & Rodrigo Schneider, 2021. "Cold bacon: co-partisan politics in Brazil," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 161-182, October.

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