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Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action

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  • Dino P. Christenson
  • Douglas L. Kriner

Abstract

The formal institutional constraints that Congress and the courts impose on presidential unilateral action are feeble. As a result, recent scholarship suggests that public opinion may be the strongest check against executive overreach. However, little is known about how the public assesses unilateral action. Through a series of five survey experiments embedded in nationally representative surveys, we examine the extent to which Americans evaluate unilateral action based on constitutional, partisan, and policy concerns. We find that Americans do not instinctively reject unilateral action as a threat to our system of checks and balances, but instead evaluate unilateral action in terms of whether it accords or conflicts with their partisan and policy preference priors. Our results suggest that the public constraint on presidential unilateral action is far from automatic. Rather, the strength and scope of this check are variable products of political contestation in the public sphere.

Suggested Citation

  • Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, 2017. "Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 335-349, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:2:p:335-349
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12262
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    References listed on IDEAS

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