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What Makes an Agency Independent?

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  • Jennifer L. Selin

Abstract

The responsiveness of government agencies to elected officials is a central question in democratic governance. A key source of variation in responsiveness is agency structure. Yet scholars often view agencies as falling into broad structural categories (e.g., cabinet departments or independent commissions) or fixate on some features of design (e.g., “for cause” protections). I develop new estimates of structural independence based on new data on 50 different structural features of 321 federal agencies in the federal executive establishment. Using a Bayesian latent variable model, I estimate independence on two dimensions: limits on the appointment of key agency decision makers and limits on political review of agency policy. I illustrate the value of this new measure by using it to examine how structure affects political influence and how agency independence can vary over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennifer L. Selin, 2015. "What Makes an Agency Independent?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(4), pages 971-987, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:4:p:971-987
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12161
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    Cited by:

    1. Mihály Fazekas & Romain Ferrali & Johannes Wachs, 2023. "Agency Independence, Campaign Contributions, and Favoritism in US Federal Government Contracting," Post-Print hal-03994320, HAL.
    2. Prato, Carlo & Turner, Ian R, 2022. "Institutional Foundations of the Power to Persuade," SocArXiv 4w9af, Center for Open Science.
    3. Breig, Zachary & Downey, Mitch, 2021. "Agency breadth and political influence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 253-268.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1871, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    5. Paul Nix & Adam Goldstein & Michael Oppenheimer, 2024. "Models of sub-national U.S. quasi-governmental organizations: implications for climate adaptation governance," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 177(6), pages 1-21, June.
    6. Yehuda Porath & Tal Sadeh, 2022. "National Debt Management Autonomy and National Debt Maturity at Issue," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2022.14, Bank of Israel.
    7. Tal Sadeh & Yehuda Porath, 2020. "Autonomous agencies and relational contracts in government bond issues," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 741-763, October.

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