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Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover

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  • Daniel Treisman

Abstract

While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover appears to matter because of selection: In authoritarian states, reformist leaders tend to either democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long‐serving leaders are rarely reformers. Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.

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  • Daniel Treisman, 2015. "Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(4), pages 927-942, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:4:p:927-942
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12135
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    Cited by:

    1. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Sekkat, Khalid, 2022. "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: how long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 429-443, June.
    2. Balamatsias, Pavlos, 2018. "Democracy and taxation," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 12, pages 1-28.
    3. Vu, Trung V., 2022. "Unbundling the effect of political instability on income redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    4. Kahsay, Goytom Abraha & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2020. "Leader turnover and forest management outcomes: Micro-level evidence from Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    5. Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, 2018. "Path dependence and transitions from tyranny to democracy: evidence from ancient Greece," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 371-388, December.
    6. Daniel Treisman, 2024. "What is predictable? A commentary on Tetlock et al. (2023)," Futures & Foresight Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), March.
    7. Stephen L. Parente & Luis Felipe Sáenz & Anna Seim, 2022. "Income, education and democracy," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 193-233, June.
    8. Hyungmin Park, 2024. "Theory of developmental dictatorship," Discussion Papers 2024-10, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    9. Belmonte, Alessandro & Rochlitz, Michael, 2020. "Collective memories, propaganda and authoritarian political support," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(3).
    10. Dorward, Nick & Fox, Sean & Hoelscher, Kristian, 2024. "Cities, Urbanization and Political Change," OSF Preprints y6qpj, Center for Open Science.
    11. Brieger Stefan & Markwardt Gunther, 2020. "The Democracy–Economy-Nexus," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 71(2), pages 135-167, August.
    12. Ho Fai Chan & Bruno S. Frey & Ahmed Skali & Benno Torgler, 2019. "Political Entrenchment and GDP Misreporting," CREMA Working Paper Series 2019-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    13. Alessandro Belmonte & Michael Rochlitz, 2017. "Collective Memories, Propaganda and Authoritarian Political Support," HSE Working papers WP BRP 43/PS/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    14. Andreas Kern & Bernhard Reinsberg & Patrick E. Shea, 2024. "Why cronies don’t cry? IMF programs, Chinese lending, and leader survival," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(3), pages 269-295, March.
    15. Brown, Craig O., 2020. "Economic leadership and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 298-333.
    16. Dario Debowicz & Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie & Petros G. Sekeris, 2023. "Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy," Discussion Papers Series 661, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    17. François, Abel & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2021. "Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    18. Ang, Joshua Ping & Guanlin, Gao & Sparks, Andrew, 2022. "A dichotomy between democracy and personal freedom on the spread of COVID-19," MPRA Paper 114909, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Sekkat, Khalid, 2021. "Democratic transitions can attract foreign direct investment: Effect, trajectories, and the role of political risk," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 340-357.
    20. Annaka, Susumu & Higashijima, Masaaki, 2021. "Political liberalization and human development: Dynamic effects of political regime change on infant mortality across three centuries (1800-2015)," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    21. Daryna Grechyna, 2018. "Shall We Riot Too? The Geographical Neighbor Impact on Political Instability," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 581-612, November.
    22. Seungjun Kim, 2023. "Protecting home: how firms’ investment plans affect the formation of bilateral investment treaties," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 667-692, October.
    23. Yue, Jiahua & Zhou, Shangsi, 2018. "Democracy’s comparative advantage: Evidence from aggregated trade data, 1962–2010," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 27-40.
    24. Espen Geelmuyden Rød & Carl Henrik Knutsen & Håvard Hegre, 2020. "The determinants of democracy: a sensitivity analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 87-111, October.

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