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How Aspiration to Office Conditions the Impact of Government Participation on Party Platform Change

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  • Gijs Schumacher
  • Marc van de Wardt
  • Barbara Vis
  • Michael Baggesen Klitgaard

Abstract

Considerable ambiguity exists regarding the effect of government/opposition status on party platform change. Existing theories predict that (1) it has no effect, (2) opposition parties change more, (3) opposition parties change more after several spells in opposition, and (4) parties’ responses vary because of different goal orientations. We propose that a party's aspiration to office, measured by its historical success or failure in entering office, determines a party's reaction to being in opposition or government. We hypothesize that, because of loss aversion, parties with low office aspiration change more when they are in government than when they are in opposition. Conversely, parties with high office aspiration change more as opposition party than as government party. We find evidence for these hypotheses through a pooled time‐series cross‐sectional analysis of 1,686 platform changes in 21 democracies, using the Comparative Manifesto Data and an innovative measure of party platform change.

Suggested Citation

  • Gijs Schumacher & Marc van de Wardt & Barbara Vis & Michael Baggesen Klitgaard, 2015. "How Aspiration to Office Conditions the Impact of Government Participation on Party Platform Change," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(4), pages 1040-1054, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:4:p:1040-1054
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12174
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshi, Swarup, 2022. "How effective are Governor's party affiliated campaign promises on crime? Evidence from U.S. states," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    2. Brian Chi-ang Lin & Siqi Zheng & Doruk İriş, 2016. "Economic Targets And Loss-Aversion In International Environmental Cooperation," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 624-648, July.
    3. Leontiou, Anastasia & Manalis, Georgios & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Bandwagons in costly elections: The role of loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 471-490.
    4. Or Tuttnauer, 2018. "If you can beat them, confront them: Party-level analysis of opposition behavior in European national parliaments," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 278-298, June.

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