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Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority: An Experimental Investigation

Author

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  • Eric S. Dickson
  • Sanford C. Gordon
  • Gregory A. Huber

Abstract

Unelected officials with coercive powers (e.g., police, prosecutors, bureaucrats) vary markedly in the extent to which citizens view their actions as legitimate. We explore the institutional determinants of legitimate authority in the context of a public goods laboratory experiment. In the experiment, an “authority” can target one “citizen” for punishment following citizen contribution choices. Untargeted citizens can then choose to help or hinder the authority. This latter choice may be interpreted as a behavioral measure of the authority's legitimacy. We find that legitimacy is affected by how authorities are compensated, the transparency with which their decisions are observed, and an interaction between these. When transparency is high, citizens are more willing to assist authorities who receive fixed salaries than those who personally benefit from collected penalties, even when citizens' material incentives are controlled for. Lower transparency reduces support, but only for salaried enforcers.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric S. Dickson & Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, 2015. "Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority: An Experimental Investigation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(1), pages 109-127, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:1:p:109-127
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12139
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcin, Isabel & Robalo, Pedro & Tausch, Franziska, 2019. "Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 243-264.
    2. Arno Apffelstaedt & Jana Freundt, 2018. "Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance," PPE Working Papers 0018, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Hannah Simpson, 2023. "Access to justice in revenue-seeking legal institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(2), pages 75-99, April.
    4. Thomas Bernauer & Steffen Mohrenberg & Vally Koubi, 2020. "Do citizens evaluate international cooperation based on information about procedural and outcome quality?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 505-529, April.
    5. Grigoriadis, Theocharis, 2017. "Religion, administration & public goods: Experimental evidence from Russia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 42-60.
    6. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2020. "Conditional cooperation and the effect of punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 150-172.
    7. Xu, Zhicheng, 2023. "Obedience to the symbol of authority: Experimental evidence on the symbolic source of legitimate authority," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    8. Vegard Tørstad, 2024. "Can transparency strengthen the legitimacy of international institutions? Evidence from the UN Security Council," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 61(2), pages 228-245, March.
    9. Alventosa, Adriana & Antonioni, Alberto & Hernández, Penélope, 2021. "Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners’ incentives affect us?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 513-537.
    10. Sveinung Arnesen & Troy S Broderstad & Mikael P Johannesson & Jonas Linde, 2019. "Conditional legitimacy: How turnout, majority size, and outcome affect perceptions of legitimacy in European Union membership referendums," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 176-197, June.

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