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What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism

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  • Rebecca Weitz‐Shapiro

Abstract

In a context where clientelism is widespread, why do some politicians choose not to condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior? I argue that the answer to this question lies in the heretofore unexamined electoral costs of clientelism: clientelism decreases support from nonpoor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor. Taking into account these costs and other factors that shape politician incentives, I posit that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in clientelism. I test this claim using an original measure of clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in Argentine municipalities. The results of statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with clientelism when poverty is also high. Only when high competition is coupled with low rates of poverty does clientelism decline.

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  • Rebecca Weitz‐Shapiro, 2012. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(3), pages 568-583, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:568-583
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00578.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Khemani, Stuti, 2015. "Buying votes versus supplying public services: Political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 84-93.
    2. repec:gig:joupla:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:3-44 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, 2016. "Competing cleavages in sub-Saharan Africa? How economic distance affects ethnic bloc politics," WIDER Working Paper Series 104, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Jonathan Phillips, 2017. "Can Bihar Break the Clientelist Trap? The Political Effects of Programmatic Development Policy," Working Papers id:11965, eSocialSciences.
    5. Miquel Pellicer & Eva Wegner & Lindsay Benstead & Harold Kincaid & Ellen Lust & Juanita Vasquez, 2014. "The demand side of clientelism: The role of client's perceptions and values," SALDRU Working Papers 140, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
    6. Verena Kroth & Valentino Larcinese & Joachim Wehner, 2016. "A Better Life for All? Democratization and Electrification in Post-Apartheid South Africa," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 60, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.

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