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The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party

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  • Robert F. Trager
  • Lynn Vavreck

Abstract

We analyze the first large‐scale, randomized experiment to measure presidential approval levels at all outcomes of a canonical international crisis‐bargaining model, thereby avoiding problems of strategic selection in evaluating presidential incentives. We find support for several assumptions made in the crisis‐bargaining literature, including that a concession from a foreign state leads to higher approval levels than other outcomes, that the magnitudes of audience costs are under presidential control prior to the initiation of hostilities, and that these costs can be made so large that presidents have incentive to fight wars they will not win. Thus, the credibility of democratic threats can be made extremely high. We also find, however, that partisan cues strongly condition presidential incentives. Party elites have incentives to behave according to type in Congress and contrary to type in the Oval Office, and Democratic presidents sometimes have incentives to fight wars they will not win.

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  • Robert F. Trager & Lynn Vavreck, 2011. "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 526-545, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:55:y:2011:i:3:p:526-545
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x
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    Cited by:

    1. James Lee Ray & Allan Dafoe, 2018. "Democratic peace versus contractualism," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(2), pages 193-203, March.
    2. Giacomo Chiozza, 2017. "Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 3-26, January.
    3. Eryan Ramadhani, 2019. "Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, , vol. 6(1), pages 30-54, April.
    4. David H. Bearce & Thomas R. Cook, 2018. "The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 595-619, December.
    5. Keren Yarhi-Milo & Joshua D. Kertzer & Jonathan Renshon, 2018. "Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(10), pages 2150-2179, November.
    6. Daniel L. Nielson & Susan D. Hyde & Judith Kelley, 2019. "The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 685-715, December.
    7. Xiaojun Li & Dingding Chen, 2021. "Public opinion, international reputation, and audience costs in an authoritarian regime," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 543-560, September.
    8. Andrew H. Kydd & Roseanne W. McManus, 2017. "Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 325-348, February.
    9. Matthew Hauenstein, 2020. "The conditional effect of audiences on credibility," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(3), pages 422-436, May.

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