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Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game‐Free Analysis of International Conflict

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  • Mark Fey
  • Kristopher W. Ramsay

Abstract

We study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict. Among our results, we show that under some weak conditions, there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war. We also show that while uncertainty about the other side's cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations, uncertainty about the other side's strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes. Along the way, we are able to assess the degree to which particular modeling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well‐known relationship between uncertainty, the incentive to misrepresent, and costly war. We find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions, whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Fey & Kristopher W. Ramsay, 2011. "Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game‐Free Analysis of International Conflict," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(1), pages 149-169, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:55:y:2011:i:1:p:149-169
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00486.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 135-166.
    2. Klein, Gordon & Rebolledo, Mayra, 2020. "Uncertainty and bargaining: A structural econometric approach," CAWM Discussion Papers 114, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
    3. Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    4. Stephane Wolton, 2024. "Decentralised information transmission in the shadow of conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 64-82, January.
    5. Philip Arena, 2015. "Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 108-131, January.
    6. Casper Sakstrup, 2021. "What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(3), pages 539-553, May.
    7. Yuleng Zeng, 2020. "Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 633-654, November.
    8. Peter Bils & William Spaniel, 2017. "Policy bargaining and militarized conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 647-678, October.
    9. Muhammet A. Bas & Robert J. Schub, 2016. "How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(6), pages 1099-1128, September.
    10. Raphaela Hennigs, 2021. "Conflict prevention by Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 710-731, August.
    11. Daniel Spiro, 2023. "Economic Warfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 10443, CESifo.
    12. William Spaniel, 2020. "Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 538-556, October.
    13. Patrick Hummel, 2015. "Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 288-300, April.
    14. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Negotiation statements with promise and threat," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 149-164, June.
    15. Gehrmann, Björn, 2019. "Krieg, Frieden und Mediation - eine wettkampftheoretische Perspektive [War, Peace and Mediation - a Contest Theory Perspective]," MPRA Paper 93645, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Benjamin Balzer & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 415-445, June.
    17. Casey Crisman-Cox, 2022. "Democracy, reputation for resolve, and civil conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(3), pages 382-394, May.

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