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Supreme Court Appointments as a Move‐the‐Median Game

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  • Keith Krehbiel

Abstract

A three‐stage model isolates conditions under which an executive appointment to a collective choice body, such as a court or a regulatory agency, has an immediate bearing on policy. The model strikes a balance between previous formal models that predict either excessive gridlock or excessive policy responsiveness as a consequence of the politics of appointments. I test the model using approximately four decades of data on U.S. Supreme Court appointments. Two hypotheses summarize the unique predictions of the model and are strongly corroborated. A third, less distinctive hypothesis about strategic judicial retirements is weakly supported.

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  • Keith Krehbiel, 2007. "Supreme Court Appointments as a Move‐the‐Median Game," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(2), pages 231-240, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:51:y:2007:i:2:p:231-240
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00247.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Console Battilana, Silvia & Shepsle, Kenneth, 2006. "Nominations for sale," MPRA Paper 1331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary E Hollibaugh Jr, 2015. "Vacancies, vetting, and votes: A unified dynamic model of the appointments process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 206-236, April.
    2. Michael A Bailey & Albert Yoon, 2011. "‘While there’s a breath in my body’: The systemic effects of politically motivated retirement from the Supreme Court," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 293-316, July.
    3. Maya Sen & William Spaniel, 2017. "How uncertainty about judicial nominees can distort the confirmation process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 22-47, January.
    4. Silvia Console-Battilana & Kenneth A. Shepsle, 2009. "Nominations for Sale," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 413-449, October.
    5. Bustos, Álvaro & Jacobi, Tonja, 2015. "Communicating judicial retirement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 107-118.
    6. Jinhee Jo & David M Primo & Yoji Sekiya, 2017. "Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 124-148, January.
    7. Andonie, Costel, 2023. "Dismissal power," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    8. Alessandra Casella & Sébastien Turban & Gregory Wawro, 2017. "Storable votes and judicial nominations in the US Senate," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 243-272, April.
    9. David M. Primo & Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, 2008. "Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 471-489, July.

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