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Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption

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  • Mark E. Warren

Abstract

While corruption has long been recognized as an appropriate object of regulation, concern with appearances of corruption is of recent origin, coinciding with declining trust in government in the mid‐ to late‐1960s. The reasoning that would support regulations of appearances, however, remains flawed, as it depends upon a “public trust” model of public service that is incomplete and often misplaced when applied to political representatives. The justification for regulating appearances is unambiguous, however, from the perspective of democratic theory. Democratic institutions of representation depend upon the integrity of appearances, not simply because they are an indication of whether political representatives are upholding their public trust, but because they provide the means through which citizens can judge whether, in particular instances, their trust is warranted. Representatives, institutions, and ethics that fail to support public confidence in appearances disempower citizens by denying them the means for inclusion in public judgments. These failures amount to a corruption of democratic processes.

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  • Mark E. Warren, 2006. "Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(1), pages 160-174, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:50:y:2006:i:1:p:160-174
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00176.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Muringani, Jonathan & Dahl Fitjar, Rune & Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés, 2024. "Political trust and economic development in European regions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 125630, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Martin Fochmann & Björn Jahnke & Andreas Wagener, 2019. "Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(3), pages 434-458, July.
    3. Christian Bjørnskov & Andreas Freytag, 2016. "An offer you can’t refuse: murdering journalists as an enforcement mechanism of corrupt deals," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 221-243, June.
    4. Jonathan Muringani & Rune Dahl Fitjar & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, 2024. "Political trust and economic development in European regions," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 73(4), pages 2059-2089, December.
    5. Ismail Adelopo & Ibrahim Rufai, 2020. "Trust Deficit and Anti-corruption Initiatives," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 429-449, May.

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