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The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies

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  • Lanny W. Martin

Abstract

Lawmaking is a challenge for coalition governments because it inherently demands cooperation and compromise by parties with divergent policy goals. The jurisdictional system of cabinet government exacerbates the problem by providing parties the means to undermine the coalition bargain in the pursuit of their own policy interests. In this article, I explore whether arrangements that allow partners to police one another induce compromise on one of the most important decisions taken by a government—the organization of the policy agenda. In an analysis of original data on the timing and policy content of over 800 government bills from four European democracies, I show that coalition governments pursue a largely “accommodative” agenda. Policy initiatives dealing with issues that are more attractive to all partners in the coalition are likely to be given priority on the agenda, while those dealing with relatively unattractive issues are likely to be postponed.

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  • Lanny W. Martin, 2004. "The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 445-461, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:3:p:445-461
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00080.x
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    Cited by:

    1. William Phelan, 2008. "Why do EU Member States Offer a 'Constitutional' Obedience to EU Obligations? Encompassing Domestic Institutions and Costly International Obligations," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp256, IIIS.
    2. Ohara, Kento & Hepplewhite, Matthew, 2024. "Just in Time? A Temporal Analysis of the Initiation of Legislation in Coalition Governments," I4R Discussion Paper Series 104, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
    3. Moritz Osnabrügge, 2015. "The European Commission and the implementation of its legislative programme," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 241-261, June.
    4. Amy Atchison & Ian Down, 2009. "Women Cabinet Ministers and Female‐Friendly Social Policy," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 1-23, July.
    5. Ghalke, Avinash & Sensarma, Rudra & Chakraborty, Sandip & Kakani, Ram Kumar, 2023. "Stock markets and economic uncertainty: Roles of legislative sessions and coalition strength," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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