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The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate Elections

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  • David R. Jones
  • Monika L. McDermott

Abstract

Responsible party government theory requires that voters hold parties electorally accountable for their performance in control of government. Existing literature suggests that voters do this only to a limited extent—holding the presidential party's candidates responsible for government performance on Election Day. While this method of voting may hold the executive accountable for his performance, it is not really an effective way to hold the party in control of Congress accountable for its performance. The method falls short particularly when Congress is controlled by a different party than the president, but also whenever a Congress controlled by the same party pursues policies different from the president's. Using surveys of voters leaving the polls in the 1990, 1994, and 1998 midterm congressional elections, this study tests whether voters' evaluations of Congress's job performance also affect their support for majority party candidates in House and Senate elections, during both unified and divided government.

Suggested Citation

  • David R. Jones & Monika L. McDermott, 2004. "The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 1-12, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:1-12
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00052.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David R. Jones, 2010. "Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 323-337, April.
    2. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    3. Alberto Batinti & Luca Andriani & Andrea Filippetti, 2019. "Local Government Fiscal Policy, Social Capital and Electoral Payoff: Evidence across Italian Municipalities," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(4), pages 503-526, November.
    4. Asger Lau Andersen & David Dreyer Lassen & Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2020. "Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(3), pages 1-19, March.
    5. Mark D. Ramirez, 2009. "The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on Congressional Approval," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 681-694, July.
    6. Juan Ortner, 2014. "Political Bargaining in a Changing World," 2014 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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