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Canadian Financial Reporting Institutions

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  • Daniel B. Thornton

Abstract

The recently published Easy Prey Investors: Why Broken Safety Nets Threaten Your Wealth lambastes virtually every aspect of Canadian financial reporting in exceptionally harsh terms. Although the authors' assertions about the implications of financial reporting violations they have seen are mostly unsubstantiated or overblown, publications like theirs are useful if they stimulate continual, thoughtful consideration of Canada's institutional arrangements. I discuss various methodologies for doing this and present some novel evidence indicating that some of the authors' assertions are simply incorrect. Canada's financial reporting institutions, like all institutions, are not perfect, so we must always listen to their critics' suggestions for reforming them; however, our institutions are in much better shape than Easy Prey Investors asserts. Institutions canadiennes du secteur de l'information financière Résumé La récente publication Easy Prey Investors: Why Broken Safety Nets Threaten Your Wealth discrédite pratiquement chaque aspect de l'information financière au Canada en des termes particulièrement sévères. Même si les affirmations des auteurs quant aux conséquences des cas de violation des principes d'information financière qu'ils ont observés ne reposent pour l'essentiel sur aucune preuve, des ouvrages comme le leur sont utiles dans la mesure où ils favorisent le suivi assidu et vigilant des dispositifs institutionnels du Canada. Diverses méthodologies permettant d'effectuer ce suivi sont ici analysées, et des preuves inédites de l'inexactitude manifeste de certaines des assertions des auteurs d'Easy Prey Investors sont avancées. Les institutions canadiennes du secteur de l'information financière, comme toutes les institutions, ne sont pas parfaites ; il nous faut donc demeurer attentifs aux suggestions de réforme que formulent ceux qui les critiquent. Nos institutions sont néanmoins dans un état bien meilleur que ne le prétend Easy Prey Investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel B. Thornton, 2018. "Canadian Financial Reporting Institutions," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 89-107, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:accper:v:17:y:2018:i:1:p:89-107
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3838.12158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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