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Understanding the Restatement Process

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  • Janne Chung
  • Susan McCracken

Abstract

Much research examines investors' reactions to restatements and the effects of restatements on chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and auditor turnover; however, little research explores the process of restating financial reports. In this study, we investigate the process of issuing a restatement. We specifically focus on the interactions among the parties involved (e.g., CFO, board, audit committee, audit partner, and regulators) in determining and ultimately resolving a restatement, as well as the impact of the restatement on the relationships among these parties. We investigate the restatement process via semi‐structured interviews. We immersed ourselves in the restatement process by interviewing all parties typically involved, such as CFOs, auditors, and regulators. Given the findings in the auditor–client management negotiation area, which suggest that negotiation of accounting treatment and disclosure is frequent, our findings indicate that negotiations and/or difficult discussions take place among the parties involved when determining whether a restatement is necessary as well as in achieving the ultimate restatement outcome. Our findings (based on a small sample) suggest that the restatement process may influence or be influenced by such factors as the nature of the misstatement, the party that identified the misstatement, the reaction of the various parties to the misstatement, disagreement among the parties on whether to restate, communication with the regulator, the press release, client size, the personality of the CFO, audit committee strength, and the relationships among the parties subsequent to the restatement. Résumé Maints chercheurs ont étudié les réactions des investisseurs aux retraitements et les répercussions de ces retraitements sur la rotation des directeurs généraux (DG), des directeurs financiers (DF) et des auditeurs. Peu d'entre eux se sont cependant intéressés au processus de retraitement des rapports financiers. Les auteures s'intéressent au processus d'établissement d'un retraitement. Elles se penchent plus précisément sur les interactions entre les parties en cause (par exemple, le DF, le conseil d'administration, le comité d'audit, l'associé d'audit et les autorités de réglementation) dans la décision relative à la nécessité du retraitement et sa réalisation ultime, ainsi que sur l'incidence du retraitement sur les relations entre ces parties. Elles analysent le processus de retraitement au moyen d'entrevues semi‐structurées. Les auteures se plongent dans le processus de retraitement en interviewant tous les intervenants habituels, dont les DF, les auditeurs et les autorités de réglementation. Compte tenu des données relevées quant à la négociation entre l'auditeur et la direction de la société cliente, données selon lesquelles le traitement comptable et les informations à fournir font fréquemment l'objet de négociations, les observations des auteures révèlent que la décision relative à la nécessité d'un retraitement et la concrétisation ultime des résultats de ce retraitement donnent lieu à des négociations et (ou) à des discussions épineuses. Les constatations des auteures (basées sur un échantillon de taille modeste) semblent indiquer que les facteurs suivants peuvent exercer une influence sur le processus de retraitement ou en subir les conséquences : la nature de l'anomalie, la partie ayant relevé l'anomalie, la réaction des diverses parties à l'anomalie, le désaccord entre les parties quant à la nécessité d'un retraitement, la communication avec les autorités de réglementation, le communiqué de presse, la taille de la société cliente, la personnalité du DF, l'ascendant du comité d'audit et les relations entre les parties à la suite du retraitement.

Suggested Citation

  • Janne Chung & Susan McCracken, 2014. "Understanding the Restatement Process," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(4), pages 253-281, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:accper:v:13:y:2014:i:4:p:253-281
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3838.12036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Suraj Srinivasan, 2005. "Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 291-334, May.
    2. Stanley, Jonathan D. & Todd DeZoort, F., 2007. "Audit firm tenure and financial restatements: An analysis of industry specialization and fee effects," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 131-159.
    3. William R. Kinney & Zoe‐Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, 2004. "Auditor Independence, Non‐Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 561-588, June.
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    2. Chen, Ester & Gavious, Ilanit, 2016. "Complementary relationship between female directors and financial literacy in deterring earnings management: The case of high-technology firms," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 114-124.

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