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Zentralisierung oder Dezentralisierung der europäischen Fiskalregeln? Zum Reformvorschlag der EU-Kommission

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  • Büttner Thiess

Abstract

The paper discusses the proposals of the EU Commission for the reform of the EU fiscal rules. Against the background of the development of the rules and the experience with the compliance, it becomes clear that the proposals represent a change of course. The decentraliszed responsibility in monitoring fiscal rules, developed after the financial crisis, will be weakened. Rather, a re-centraliszation of fiscal surveil-lance is proposed. In the author’s view, this would also weaken also national ownership of the fiscal rules and thus erode their effectiveness. Implementation of the proposals would instead lead to greater political capture of the EU fiscal rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Büttner Thiess, 2023. "Zentralisierung oder Dezentralisierung der europäischen Fiskalregeln? Zum Reformvorschlag der EU-Kommission," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, vol. 103(5), pages 301-304, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:103:y:2023:i:5:p:301-304:n:9
    DOI: 10.2478/wd-2023-0094
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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