IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vrs/ijomae/v60y2024i4p285-297n1002.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Passenger car market and regional price discriminations for new cars: Case study and empirical analysis for Poland 2004–2021

Author

Listed:
  • Bielig Andreas

    (Collegium of World Economy, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland)

Abstract

Poland disposes on a large stock of mostly aged private passenger cars. In contrast younger cars still play minor role in individual mobility. The contribution analyzes reasons of lagging modernization by focusing on new cars prices with respect to regional price discrimination. It finds in 2004-2021 substantially increasing new cars prices and regional price discrimination between Poland and Germany. Price differentials were positive, with lower prices in Poland, and increased during time. Producers discriminated by prices increasingly but also limited arbitrage transactions by controlling excess differentials. Optimal regional price discrimination could support car markets developments in Poland by stock age compositions shifts towards younger cars. However, applied discrimination proves in observed market environments not sufficient to achieve a great car market transition in near future.

Suggested Citation

  • Bielig Andreas, 2024. "Passenger car market and regional price discriminations for new cars: Case study and empirical analysis for Poland 2004–2021," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 60(4), pages 285-297.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:ijomae:v:60:y:2024:i:4:p:285-297:n:1002
    DOI: 10.2478/ijme-2024-0019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/ijme-2024-0019
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2478/ijme-2024-0019?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
    2. Holmes, Thomas J, 1989. "The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 244-250, March.
    3. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.‐C. Lai, 2008. "Parallel imports and price controls," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 378-402, June.
    4. Xavier D’Haultfœuille & Isis Durrmeyer & Philippe Février, 2019. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium with Unobserved Price Discrimination," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(5), pages 1973-1998.
    5. Amrstong, Mark & Cowan, Simon & Vickers, John, 1995. "Nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 33-55, September.
    6. Schmalensee, Richard, 1981. "Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-247, March.
    7. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    8. Vlad Radoias, 2016. "Direct and indirect price discrimination in the automotive industries of the European Union," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 975-990, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
    2. Acharyya, Rajat & García-Alonso, María D.C., 2012. "Income based price subsidies and parallel imports," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 25-41.
    3. Séverine Haller & Marie-Hélène Jeanneret, 2003. "Importations parallèles sur le marché automobile européen : une analyse en termes de différenciation verticale," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 69(2), pages 181-204.
    4. Tang, Yao & Chen, Rachel R. & Guan, Xu, 2021. "Daily-deal market with consumer retention: Price discrimination or quality differentiation," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    5. Brown, Drusilla K. & Norman, George, 2012. "Optimal intellectual property rights protection during an international health emergency," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1009-1016.
    6. Ishikawa, Jota & Morita, Hodaka & Mukunoki, Hiroshi, 2020. "Parallel imports and repair services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 137-160.
    7. Geng, Difei & Saggi, Kamal, 2017. "International effects of national regulations: External reference pricing and price controls," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 68-84.
    8. Ikeda, Takeshi & Toshimitsu, Tsuyoshi, 2010. "Third-degree price discrimination, quality choice, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 54-56, January.
    9. Anderson, Simon P & Ginsburgh, Victor A, 1999. "International Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 126-139, February.
    10. Bennato, Anna Rita & Valletti, Tommaso, 2014. "Pharmaceutical innovation and parallel trade," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 83-92.
    11. Qihong Liu, 2016. "Market Foreclosure and the Welfare Impacts of Price Discrimination," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 337-348.
    12. Geng, Difei & Saggi, Kamal, 2020. "Optimal price regulations in international pharmaceutical markets with generic competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    13. Feuerstein Switgard, 2002. "Home Bias, internationale Preisdifferenzierung und Wirtschaftsintegration / Home Bias, International Price Discrimination and Economic Integration," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 222(1), pages 112-131, February.
    14. Giorgio Matteucci & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2017. "Drug innovation, price controls, and parallel trade," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 159-179, June.
    15. Kamal Saggi, 2016. "Trade, Intellectual Property Rights, and the World Trade Organization," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00014, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    16. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2011. "Price Discrimination," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
    18. Sofia Berto Villas‐Boas, 2009. "An empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 20-46, March.
    19. Takanori Adachi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2014. "The Welfare Effects Of Third-Degree Price Discrimination In A Differentiated Oligopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(3), pages 1231-1244, July.
    20. Imke Reimers & Claire (Chunying) Xie, 2019. "Do Coupons Expand or Cannibalize Revenue? Evidence from an e-Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 286-300, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    price discrimination; passenger cars; market development; Poland;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L62 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment; Related Parts and Equipment

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vrs:ijomae:v:60:y:2024:i:4:p:285-297:n:1002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sgh.waw.pl/kgs/en .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.