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Testing out the disciplinary role of debt in Croatian banks

Author

Listed:
  • Bambulović Mario

    (Croatian National Bank, Zagreb, Croatia)

  • Huljak Ivan
  • Kožul Antonija

    (McKinsey & Company, Zagreb, Croatia)

Abstract

According to the agency theory, debt brings discipline to management and therefore, one way of reducing agency costs is by increasing the level of indebtedness. Even though there are a number of specificities of banks as corporations, this agency theory postulate should still be valid. This research is motivated by the need to understand microeconomics of banking better, which could be especially rewarding in CEE countries where the issues of credit risk, bank capital and corporate governance are specific. Accordingly, by testing the disciplinary role of debt in Croatian banks, we contribute to the still scarce literature on bank governance in Croatia. We operationalise the research by first generating an efficiency measure, which we believe adequately represents management efforts and ability to maximize the value of owners’ investment. In the next step, we explore the relation between banks' efficiency and leverage. Our results do not indicate that debt generally creates a discipline mechanism for bank managers in Croatia.

Suggested Citation

  • Bambulović Mario & Huljak Ivan & Kožul Antonija, 2017. "Testing out the disciplinary role of debt in Croatian banks," Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics, Sciendo, vol. 3(1), pages 45-62, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:crebss:v:3:y:2017:i:1:p:45-62:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/crebss-2017-0004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Berger, Allen N. & Bonaccorsi di Patti, Emilia, 2006. "Capital structure and firm performance: A new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1065-1102, April.
    2. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1982. "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 107-140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Admati, Anat R. & Hellwig, Martin F., 2013. "Does Debt Discipline Bankers? An Academic Myth about Bank Indebtedness," Research Papers 3031, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency theory; banking sector; Croatia; managerial efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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