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Bicameralism: European Tendencies and Perspectives for Ukraine

Author

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  • Tatsiy Vasyl

    (Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University Pushkinska 77, Kharkiv 61024, Ukraine)

  • Serohina Svitlana

    (Scientific Research Institute of State Building and Local Government of National Academy of Law Sciences of Ukraine Chernyshevska 80, Kharkiv 61002, Ukraine)

Abstract

The authors of the article continue the scientific discourse on the role and significance of bicameralism for building a modern democratic legal state. The main arguments of supporters and opponents of bicameralism have been analysed, given the complicated development of Ukrainian institutional framework and discussions over the European Committee of Regions evolution. The authors of the article attempt to supplement the list of arguments that exist in modern legal literature in favor of Ukraine’s transition to bicameralism. The challenges of European integration for Ukrainian parliament as a unitary actor have been highlighted. The authors substantiate the thesis that the formation of the second (upper) chamber does not threaten the Ukrainian unitarianism, but will contribute to further diversification of state power and at the same time increase the stability of the government in terms of a consensual, pluralistic democracy and semi-presidential government.

Suggested Citation

  • Tatsiy Vasyl & Serohina Svitlana, 2018. "Bicameralism: European Tendencies and Perspectives for Ukraine," TalTech Journal of European Studies, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 101-122, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:bjeust:v:8:y:2018:i:1:p:101-122:n:7
    DOI: 10.1515/bjes-2018-0007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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