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Mechanisms for Development of Property Rights Institutions

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  • Jelena Žarković

Abstract

The institution of property rights is increasingly recognized as an essential building block of an economically prosperous society. The question that remains unsolved, however, is how do we develop effective property rights institutions? The literature dealing with the development of property rights tends to be, in general, an optimistic one since there is a tendency to view the design of property rights institutions as maximizing decisions to economize on transaction costs and to facilitate new economic activities. On the other hand, since property rights define the distribution of wealth and political power in a society, changes in property rights structures are likely to be influenced by more than pure efficiency considerations. Therefore, in order to achieve a balanced analysis of the evolution of property rights institutions, the model of endogenous property rights creation should be modified. We did that by introducing the neoinstitutional theory of the state in the model. Key words: Endogenous property rights creation, Prisoners dilemma, Cooperation, Exogenous property rights creation, Neoinstitutional theory of the state.JEL: P26, D72.

Suggested Citation

  • Jelena Žarković, 2006. "Mechanisms for Development of Property Rights Institutions," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 53(3), pages 283-298.
    • Handle: RePEc:voj:journl:v:53:y:2006:i:3:p:283-298:id:316
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    Keywords

    Endogenous property rights creation; Prisoners dilemma; Cooperation; Exogenous property rights creation; Neoinstitutional theory of the state;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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