IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vep/journl/y2006v114i1-2p37-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interessi economici, potere politico e rappresentanza parlamentare in Italia nel periodo 1948-2002

Author

Listed:
  • Luigi CAMPIGLIO

    (Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

Abstract

The motivation of this paper is to propose a new interpretation of the relationship between economics and politics in Italy: the main results are the following. Parties’ coalition power, as measured by Shapley-Shubik index, helps to explain the governmental formation process, together with the power of passing a law. We find that the president and the prime minister exercise a significant appointment power: together with main parties’ secretaries and the Bank of Italy governor they represent the restricted power e´lite. During the first republic the confirmation power in Parliament is high, with a premium for the Christian Democratic Party: since 1994, with the second republic, the confirmation power decreases and becomes more volatile. Parliamentary professional composition suggests that the distance between political representation and electoral basis tends to increase and become more polarized. Electoral vote is retrospective and takes the economic growth of the previous legislature as the basic information

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi CAMPIGLIO, 2006. "Interessi economici, potere politico e rappresentanza parlamentare in Italia nel periodo 1948-2002," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 114(1-2), pages 37-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2006:v:114:i:1-2:p:37-66
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://riss.vitaepensiero.it/scheda-articolo_digital/luigi-campiglio/interessi-economici-potere-politico-e-rappresentanza-parlamentare-in-italia-nel-periodo-1948-2002-000518_2006_0001_0039-150834.html
    Download Restriction: Yes
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Caruso, Raul & Schneider, Friedrich, 2013. "Brutality of Jihadist terrorism. A contest theory perspective and empirical evidence in the period 2002–2010," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 685-696.
    2. John S L McCombie & Marta Spreafico, 2013. "Can only democracies enhance “Human Development”? Evidence from the Former Soviet Countries," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0066, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    3. Giuseppina Malerba & Marta Spreafico, 2014. "The rich and the poor in the EU and the Great Recession: Evidence from a Panel Analysis," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0068, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    4. Luigi Pierfranco Campiglio, 2013. "Why Italy's saving rate became (so) low?," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0063, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    5. Campiglio, Luigi Pierfranco, 2014. "Unbundling the Great European Recession (2009-2013): Unemployment, Consumption, Investment, Inflation and Current Account," MPRA Paper 53002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Luigi Pierfranco Campiglio, 2012. "Market's SINS and the European Welfare State: theory and empirical evidences," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0060, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    development planning; human dignity; freedom of initiative; institutional arrangements.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vep:journl:y:2006:v:114:i:1-2:p:37-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Vep - Vita e Pensiero (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.