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Why is There Mandatory Retirement? An Empirical Reexamination

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  • Duane E. Leigh

Abstract

A widely cited explanation of mandatory retirement age provisions is the "incentives" model developed and tested by Lazear. The research reported here builds upon Lazear's empirical framework by adding testable implications drawn from a specific human capital explanation of mandatory retirement. The role of monitoring costs in accounting for mandatory retirement rules is also discussed. The evidence presented, based on data from the NLS mature men sample, indicates that, in addition to the personal characteristics examined by Lazear, a comprehensive explanation of mandatory retirement requires the consideration of both specific human capital and monitoring costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Duane E. Leigh, 1984. "Why is There Mandatory Retirement? An Empirical Reexamination," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 19(4), pages 512-531.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:19:y:1984:i:4:p:512-531
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    Cited by:

    1. Margareta Vania Putri & Catur Sugiyanto, 2023. "The Retirement Consumption Puzzle Effect in Indonesia: Evidence from IFLS 4 and 5," Gadjah Mada Economics Working Paper Series 202303004, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada.
    2. Tai Lee & Joonmo Cho, 2022. "Unintended consequences of the retirement‐age extension in South Korea," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 36(1), pages 105-125, May.
    3. Nadide Banu Olcay, 2016. "Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 255-288, December.
    4. Björklund, Anders & Åkerman, Jeanette, 1989. "Piece-Rates, On-the-Job Training and the Wage-Tenure Profile," Working Paper Series 246, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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