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Improving regulatory enforcement and inspection activities based on evaluation of business motives behind regulatory compliance

Author

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  • Elena I. Dobrolyubova

    (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Regulatory enforcement is one of the important areas of public administration in Russia. Its successful implementation is largely determined by the key factors influencing the level of business regulatory compliance. The paper identifies the key motives of voluntary compliance with regulatory norms and establishes the areas for improvement in regulatory enforcement activities in Russia based on the empirical data obtained from a representative survey of private businesses in Russia. Methodologically, the paper relies on theoretical regulatory enforcement models such as deterrence-based enforcement, risk-based enforcement, cooperative enforcement and procedural justice model. Using correlation analysis, we identify the key factors of regulatory compliance in Russia: compliance with the results of inspection, labor costs incurred in the implementation of inspection, and informal payments. The article demonstrates that regulatory compliance also correlates with business perceptions of complexity and adequacy of the regulatory framework. The results of the analysis suggest that the traditional deterrence-based enforcement model involving significant number of business inspections is ineffective in Russia. The key areas of improvement in regulatory enforcement in Russia include implementing the risk-oriented approach, combating corruption, reducing administrative costs, and radical optimization of regulatory requirements as part of the ‘regulatory guillotine’ efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena I. Dobrolyubova, 2021. "Improving regulatory enforcement and inspection activities based on evaluation of business motives behind regulatory compliance," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 12(2), pages 63-73, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:url:upravl:v:12:y:2021:i:2:p:63-73
    DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2021-12-2-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. A. Shastitko & Sergey Plaksin, 2013. "The effects of penalties: From theory to practice," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 3, pages 110-131.
    3. Vladimir Yuzhakov & Elena Dobrolyubova & Andrei Pokida & Natalya Zybunovskaya, 2019. "Inspection And Regulatory Enforcement Reform: Evaluation From The Citizen Perspective," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 2, pages 71-92.
    4. Aleksandr Chaplinskiy & Sergey Plaksin, 2016. "Risk Management in the State Control in Russia," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 2, pages 7-29.
    5. Florentin Blanc & Michael Faure, 2020. "Smart enforcement in the EU," Journal of Risk Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(11), pages 1405-1423, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public administration; business; regulatory enforcement; motives; regulatory compliance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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