IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/uns/esteco/v22y2005i44p41-52.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Preferencias sociales en un juego sencillo de coparticipación

Author

Listed:
  • Camilo Rubbini
  • César Mateo

Abstract

Experimental evidence suggests that individuals' choices depart systematically from self-interest behavior. It reports the results of a simple experimental dictator game played by students from different departments at Universidad Nacional de La Plata to contrast these model predictions with more sophisticated representations of social preferences. The results show that individuals incorporate fairness considerations in their choices. Particularly, in the considered framework, fairness seems to be linked with equality

Suggested Citation

  • Camilo Rubbini & César Mateo, 2005. "Preferencias sociales en un juego sencillo de coparticipación," Estudios Economicos, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia, vol. 22(44), pages 41-52, january-j.
    • Handle: RePEc:uns:esteco:v:22:y:2005:i:44:p:41-52
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://revistas.uns.edu.ar/ee/article/view/878/528
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    teoría de los juegos; diseño experimental; comportamiento individual; preferencias sociales;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uns:esteco:v:22:y:2005:i:44:p:41-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nelly A. José or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deunsar.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.