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Lifetime Employment and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Profit Maximising and Joint-Stock Firms

Author

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  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi

    (Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan.)

Abstract

This paper investigates endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly consisting of a profit-maximising firm and a joint-stock firm. There are two stages and the firms simultaneously and independently announce in which stage they will offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. If both firms decide to offer lifetime employment in the same stage, a simultaneous commitment game occurs, whereas if both firms choose different stages, a sequential commitment game arises. At the end of the game, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its actual output. The paper presents the equilibrium of the endogenous-timing mixed duopoly model.

Suggested Citation

  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2014. "Lifetime Employment and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Profit Maximising and Joint-Stock Firms," Institutions and Economies (formerly known as International Journal of Institutions and Economies), Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, vol. 6(3), pages 1-14, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:umk:journl:v:6:y:2014:i:3:p:1-14
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous Timing; Profit-Maximising Firm; Joint-Stock Firm; Lifetime Employment; Strategic Commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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