IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/udc/esteco/v40y2013i2p247-254.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

Author

Listed:
  • Aitor Ciarreta
  • Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita

Abstract

In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.

Suggested Citation

  • Aitor Ciarreta & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2013. "Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 40(2 Year 20), pages 247-254, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:247-254
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.estudiosdeeconomia.cl/publicacion/show/id/1419
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal punishments; detection lags; collusion sustainability.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:247-254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Verónica Kunze (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuclcl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.