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Autorregulación con la posibilidad de corrupción

Author

Listed:
  • Javier Núñez
  • Guillermo Díaz
  • Miguel Vargas

Abstract

Este trabajo investiga los incentivos que tienen organismos autorregulados (OA) para una regulación de calidad efectiva. Se plantea un análisis de agencia, según el cual dentro del OA existe un principal encargado de vigilar el cumplimiento de los estándares de calidad por parte de los miembros del OA (agentes), y de denunciar a quienes no lo hagan. La motivación para esta actividad regulatoria es reputacional, dado un contexto de información asimétrica entre el OA y los consumidores: estos no pueden observar la calidad de los bienes provistos por el OA. Así la clidad surge endógenamente a partir de la interacción estratégica entre agente y principal. El presente trabajo analiza como la posibilidad de corrupción afecta los incentivos de un esquema de autorregulación (AR). Corrupción significa que los agentes sorprendidos cometiendo fraude (incumplimiento de estándares de calidad) pagan un soborno para evitar ser castigados. El principal resultado encontrado es que el equilibrio más probables es aque

Suggested Citation

  • Javier Núñez & Guillermo Díaz & Miguel Vargas, 2003. "Autorregulación con la posibilidad de corrupción," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 30(2 Year 20), pages 179-198, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:30:y:2003:i:2:p:179-198
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organismos Autorregulados; credence goods; juegos dinámicos con información incompleta; agente-principal.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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