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Selección adversa: una introducción al diseño de mecanismos

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  • José María da Rocha

Abstract

El objeto de este artículo es introducir al lector en el diseño de contratos en un mercado de selección adversa, es decir, cuando las decisiones del principal dependen de alguna característica que es información privada de los agentes. Se mostrará que el principal puede inducir a los agentes a revelar honestamente su característica si se les incentiva suficientemente. Tras estudiar las características generales del diseño de incentivos en un marco estático, se analiza la forma de los contratos cuando la relación se repite. Prestaremos especial atención a los problemas que surgen si el principal no tiene capacidad para comprometerse y se produce el “efecto ratchet”. Por último, se presentan dos situaciones en las que el principal puede observar ex post alguna señal sobre el tipo del agente.

Suggested Citation

  • José María da Rocha, 1993. "Selección adversa: una introducción al diseño de mecanismos," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 20(2 Year 19), pages 251-301, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:20:y:1993:i:2:p:251-301
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    Keywords

    Selección adversa; mecanismos.;

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