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Voting Systems and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Runoff and Plurality Elections

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  • Davide Cipullo

Abstract

This paper compares policy outcomes under the runoff voting system and the plurality rule by exploiting the assignment of municipalities in Italy to different voting systems based on a population threshold. Mayors, who are the head of the local political power, are elected using a plurality rule in municipalities having fewer than 15,000 residents, while they are elected using a runoff system in municipalities above the threshold. Regression-discontinuity estimates show that municipalities under the runoff system spend 12 percent more than those under the plurality rule and that additional expenditures are not financed via higher taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Cipullo, 2021. "Voting Systems and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Runoff and Plurality Elections," National Tax Journal, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(2), pages 347-376.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:nattax:doi:10.1086/714181
    DOI: 10.1086/714181
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    Cited by:

    1. Matteo Gamalerio & Massimo Morelli & Margherita Negri, 2021. "The Political Economy of Open Borders: Theory and Evidence on the role of Electoral Rules," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21157, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Kevin Dano & Francesco Ferlenga & Vincenzo Galasso & Caroline Le Pennec & Vincent Pons, 2022. "Coordination and Incumbency Advantage in Multi-Party Systems - Evidence from French Elections," NBER Working Papers 30541, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Matteo Gamalerio & Massimo Morelli & Margherita Negri, 2021. "The Political Economy of Open Borders: Theory and Evidence on the role of Electoral Rules," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21157, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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