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Private Monopoly and Restricted Entry—Evidence from the Notary Profession

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  • Frank Verboven
  • Biliana Yontcheva

Abstract

We study entry restrictions in a private monopoly: the Latin notary system. Under this widespread system, the state grants notaries exclusive rights to certify important economic transactions, including real estate. To uncover the current policy goals behind the geographic entry restrictions, we develop an empirical entry model that incorporates a spatial demand model and a multioutput production model. We find that the entry restrictions serve primarily producer interests and give only a small weight to consumer surplus. We show how reform would generate considerable welfare improvements and imply a substantial redistribution toward consumers without threatening geographic coverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Verboven & Biliana Yontcheva, 2024. "Private Monopoly and Restricted Entry—Evidence from the Notary Profession," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(11), pages 3658-3707.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/730549
    DOI: 10.1086/730549
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    JEL classification:

    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services
    • L88 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Government Policy

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