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Persuasion for the Long Run

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  • James Best
  • Daniel Quigley

Abstract

We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard in repeated games), persuasion frequently requires inefficient on-path punishment—even if accuracy is monitored perfectly. If instead the record publishes coarse summary statistics (as is common online), any communication equilibrium the sender prefers to one-shot cheap talk—including Bayesian persuasion—can be supported without cost.

Suggested Citation

  • James Best & Daniel Quigley, 2024. "Persuasion for the Long Run," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(5), pages 1740-1791.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/727282
    DOI: 10.1086/727282
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    Cited by:

    1. Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2024. "Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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