IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/doi10.1086-722985.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Yeon-Koo Che
  • Kyungmin Kim
  • Konrad Mierendorff

Abstract

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow’s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in Markov perfect equilibrium as the cost vanishes.

Suggested Citation

  • Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Konrad Mierendorff, 2023. "Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(7), pages 1797-1844.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/722985
    DOI: 10.1086/722985
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722985
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722985
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/722985?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kawamura, Kohei & Le Quement, Mark T., 2023. "News credibility and the quest for clicks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    2. Raphael Boleslavsky, 2023. "Waiting for Fake News," Papers 2304.04053, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    3. Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    4. Herresthal, Claudia, 2022. "Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    5. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/722985. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.