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Informationally Simple Incentives

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  • Simon Gleyze
  • Agathe Pernoud

Abstract

We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others’. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others’ preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons. First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant-strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, this endogenizes an “independent-private-value” property of the interim information structure. We show that, generically, a mechanism is informationally simple if and only if it satisfies a separability condition that rules out most economically meaningful mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Gleyze & Agathe Pernoud, 2023. "Informationally Simple Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(3), pages 802-837.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/722089
    DOI: 10.1086/722089
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Feffer, 2024. "Scoring Auctions with Coarse Beliefs," Papers 2410.06150, arXiv.org.

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