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Communication and Community Enforcement

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  • Takuo Sugaya
  • Alexander Wolitzky

Abstract

We study the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a “bad type” who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners’ identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the absence of explicit communication but that introducing within-match cheap talk communication restores cooperation. Thus, communication is essential for community enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2021. "Communication and Community Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(9), pages 2595-2628.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/715023
    DOI: 10.1086/715023
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    Cited by:

    1. Oguzhan Celebi, 2023. "Substitutability in Favor Exchange," Papers 2309.10749, arXiv.org.
    2. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2023. "Bad apples in symmetric repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.

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