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Improving College Instruction through Incentives

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  • Andy Brownback
  • Sally Sadoff

Abstract

In a field experiment, we examine the impact of performance-based incentives for community college instructors. Instructor incentives improve student exam scores, course grades, and credit accumulation while reducing course dropout. Effects are largest among part-time adjunct instructors. During the program, instructor incentives have large positive spillovers, increasing completion rates and grades in students’ courses outside our study. One year after the program, instructor incentives increase transfer rates to 4-year colleges with no impact on 2-year college degrees. We find no evidence of complementarities between instructor incentives and student incentives. Finally, while instructors initially prefer gain-framed contracts over our loss-framed ones, preferences for loss-framed contracts significantly increase after experience with them.

Suggested Citation

  • Andy Brownback & Sally Sadoff, 2020. "Improving College Instruction through Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(8), pages 2925-2972.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/707025
    DOI: 10.1086/707025
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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Englmaier & Stefan Grimm & Dominik Grothe & David Schindler & Simeon Schudy, 2024. "The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(8), pages 2695-2747.
    2. Paul J. Ferraro & J. Dustin Tracy, 2022. "A reassessment of the potential for loss-framed incentive contracts to increase productivity: a meta-analysis and a real-effort experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1441-1466, November.
    3. Bulte, Erwin & List, John A. & van Soest, Daan, 2021. "Incentive spillovers in the workplace: Evidence from two field experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 137-149.
    4. Solomon Balew & Erwin Bulte & Zewdu Abro & Menale Kassie, 2023. "Incentivizing and nudging farmers to spread information: Experimental evidence from Ethiopia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(3), pages 994-1010, May.
    5. Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Fei & Zubanov, Nick, 2024. "Working more for more and working more for less: Labor supply in the gain and loss domains," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    6. Lamar Pierce & Alex Rees-Jones & Charlotte Blank, 2020. "The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives," NBER Working Papers 26619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Gómez, Maria Fernanda & González-Velosa, Carolina, 2023. "Can a Pay-for- Performance Program Help the Vulnerable find Jobs during a Pandemic?: Experimental Evidence from Empleate in Colombia," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12982, Inter-American Development Bank.

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