IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/doi10.1086-697740.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

Author

Listed:
  • Jeremy T. Fox
  • Chenyu Yang
  • David H. Hsu

Abstract

Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy T. Fox & Chenyu Yang & David H. Hsu, 2018. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1339-1373.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/697740
    DOI: 10.1086/697740
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/697740
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/697740
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/697740?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gaonkar, Shweta & Mele, Angelo, 2023. "A model of inter-organizational network formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 82-104.
    2. Guoli Chen & Sterling Huang & Philipp Meyer‐Doyle & Denisa Mindruta, 2021. "Generalist versus specialist CEOs and acquisitions: Two‐sided matching and the impact of CEO characteristics on firm outcomes," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(6), pages 1184-1214, June.
    3. Zhang, Jing & Fan, Yueqi & Liu, Ye, 2024. "The effects of government venture capital: New evidence from China based on a two-sided matching structural model," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    4. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2023. "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," Post-Print hal-03935865, HAL.
    5. Benjamin L. Hallen & Susan L. Cohen & Sung Ho Park, 2023. "Are seed accelerators status springboards for startups? Or sand traps?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(8), pages 2060-2096, August.
    6. Cristina Gualdani & Shruti Sinha, 2019. "Partial Identification in Matching Models for the Marriage Market," Papers 1902.05610, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    7. Tamás Fleiner & Ravi Jagadeesan & Zsuzsanna Jankó & Alexander Teytelboym, 2019. "Trading Networks With Frictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1633-1661, September.
    8. Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Anderberg, Dan & Bagger, Jesper & Wilson, Tanya, 2019. "Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability," CEPR Discussion Papers 13590, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Wang, Lu & Su, Zhong-qin & Fung, Hung-Gay & Jin, Hong-min & Xiao, Zuoping, 2021. "Do CEOs with academic experience add value to firms? Evidence on bank loans from Chinese firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    10. Allen, Roy, 2022. "Injectivity and the law of demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    11. Nail Kashaev, 2018. "Identification and estimation of multinomial choice models with latent special covariates," Papers 1811.05555, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
    12. Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021. "Market Design," NBER Working Papers 29367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. YingHua He & Shruti Sinha & Xiaoting Sun, 2021. "Identification and Estimation in Many-to-one Two-sided Matching without Transfers," Papers 2104.02009, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    14. Suguru Otani & Takuma Matsuda, 2023. "Unified Merger List in the Container Shipping Industry from 1966: A Structural Estimation of the Transition of Importance of a Firm's Age, Tonnage Capacity, and Geographical Proximity on Merger Decisi," Papers 2310.09938, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    15. Suguru Otani, 2021. "Estimating Endogenous Coalitional Mergers: Merger Costs and Assortativeness of Size and Specialization," Papers 2108.12744, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    16. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," Papers 2109.07932, arXiv.org.
    17. Suguru Otani, 2022. "Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games," Papers 2204.00713, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    18. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers 2106.02371, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    19. Roy Allen & John Rehbeck, 2020. "Hicksian complementarity and perturbed utility models," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 245-261, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/697740. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.